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Fifth, a sense of the lack of parity of sacrifice between
creditor banks and the populations of debtor
countries in the treatment of the problem since 1982
was spreading; this uneven impact of the prevailing
strategy was even causing disquiet amongst some of
the staff of the IFIs.
Sixth, contributing to that feeling of disquiet was the
evidence that IFI-designed structural adjustment
programmes had much less chance of working if
resources needed for investment had to be continually
diverted fully to service the ever growing burden of
commercial bank debt.
Seventh, in a period of high interest rates and weak
commodity prices the underlying quality of IMF
advances and of World Bank loans might themselves
be damaged unless the burgeoning and ultimately
competing claims of the commercial banks could be
reduced.
Eighth, certain political considerations had assumed
more immediate importance for the US administration,
for example the need to come to terms with a new
President of Mexico as orthodox in his financial
policies as any Mexican President was likely to be; the
desire to preserve democracy in Argentina; the need to
respond to the anti-debt, anti-adjustment riots in
Venezuela; and the wish to bolster Mrs. Cory
Aquino's popularity in the Philippines.
Ninth, the possibility of getting the IFIs and the
Japanese Government indirectly to help out the more
exposed US banks (and the US Treasury) was not in
itself unattractive.
Tenth and finally, Mr. Brady's installation as US
Secretary of the Treasury gave his Assistant Secretary
scope to introduce a new policy that would
differentiate him from his predecessor and at the same
time fit in with the more comprehensive and flexible
approach to the countries of Latin America favoured
by President Bush.
Similarities and Differences
The announcement of a new policy,iike a death in the
family, however expected it may be always comes as a
bit of a shock when it actually happens. The contents
of the Brady proposals, as presented on March 10 1989
should not however have occasioned any great
surprise. They had been circulated in draft form and
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Ten Reasons for the Timing
A variety of reasons have been advanced as to why the
Brady proposals came when they did and why they
incorporated for the first time official US backing for
schemes of debt reduction that would involve
enhancements from the international financial
institutions.
First, the extant 'Baker Plan' strategy had run out of
credibility. It is important to say that rather than that
the plan had failed, because an accusation of failure
involves an assumption about what the underlying
objectives of the strategy actually were. Some blamed
the failure of the commercial banks to come up with
the amount of new funding which the strategy had
required; some argued that the banks had done their
bit but the response of the IFIs had fallen short;' some
believed that the major part of the failure lay at the
door of the LDC debtors themselves for not adjusting
their internal policies rapidly and rigorously enough.
But Wherever the blame lay it was clear by mid-1988
that the strategy was not enabling most severely
indebted countries to grow out of their problems and
that the critical ratios of creditworthiness were not
generally improving.
Second, the international financial system was no
longer felt to be vulnerable to whatever actions the
debtors might take or, by 1990, to a more radical
approach to the entire problem than had been
manifest in the previous procedures for repetitive
reschedulings.
Third, most of the major tending banks had succeeded
in making substantial provisions against loss of part of
the principal owed or failure to receive prompt
payment of interest as well as in strengthening their
capital ratios.
Fourth, the performance of the secondary market
where LDC loans were being traded at deep and
generally growing discounts was assuming increasing
significance - debtors were asking 'why are we
attempting to service our loans in full when the market
considers them to be worth less than half their face
value?' and 'what can be done to enable us to capture
the discounts?'
See William Cime 'From Baker to Brady: Managrng International
Debt'. Amex Bank Review. Marjohn Prize Essays, 1989.
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The Shaping of the Brady Proposals
subjected to considerable criticism including some
from institutions which found it necessary to welcome
the proposals when they later became official US
policy. All the main ingredients in the Brady mixture
can be found in earlier publications or statements by
commentators on the Third World debt situation.
Amongst the most influential of these were 'Voluntary
Approaches to Debt Relief' by John Williamson,2 'Six
Principles for a Revitalised Debt Strategy' by Moeen
Qureshi,3 and the statement put out by Horst
Schulmann of the Institute of International Finance
(11F).4
It can thus be argued that one part of the impact of the
Brady proposals was mainly psychological - the
explicit recognition that the external debt of many
developing countries had grown so large that it could
not possibly be fully serviced and that forms of debt
relief were therefore unavoidable. It was not the truth
of this proposition, which had been evident to many
people for a considerable time, that mattered; it was
the significance of a Secretary of the US Treasury for
the first time publicly acknowledging it.
US Government officials like to refer to the Brady
proposals as 'the strengthened strategy' for dealing
with LDC debt and it is a useful touchstone for seeing
whether individuals (or institutions) feel themselves
beholden to US influence to detect whether or not they
use this same nomenclature. In this article it is
suggested that there are four significant similarities
between the Baker and the Brady strategies and four
significant points of difference.
The similarities are these:
The Case-by-Case approach in dealing with
individual sovereign debtors is to be preserved
although within a different framework of options.
Agreement by the debtor to a programme of
adjustment with the IMF remains a pre-condition of
eligibility for the new facilities and full conditionalities
are to be maintained.
Participation by commercial banks in one or other
of the options is to remain on a supposedly voluntary
basis, the use of the word 'voluntary' in this context
not being intended to inhibit government authorities
from a certain amount of necessary 'arm-twisting'.
As with earlier phases of the strategy, the proposals
were worked out and introduced by US officials and
were heavily influenced by regional geo-political
considerations.5
John williamson 'Voluntary Approaches to Debt Relie!', Institute
for International Economics. September. 1988.
Moeen Qureshi' Six Principles for a Revitalised Debt Strategy' in
Adrian Hewitt and Bowen Wells 'Growing Out of Debt published
by the Overseas Development Institute for the All Party
Parliamentary Group on Overseas Development. 1989.
'H. Schulmann 'The Way Forward for the Middle-ltsconie
Cotintries', 11F, Washington DC, January, 1989.
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The differences are these:
The negative pledge and sharing clauses in the
original syndicated loan agreements should be waived
so as to allow different banks to select different
options in converting out of those loans.
Governments are urged to induce their tax and
regulatory authorities to amend or to interpret their
tax treatment and banking regulations so as to
facilitate (or even encourage) the participation of
banks in schemes of debt or interest rate reduction.
The IMF and the World Bank would henceforth be
willing to disburse their advances and loans in certain
circumstances even if the sovereign debtor concerned
had not reached a conclusive agreement with its
commercial bank creditors - thus of course
weakening the power of those creditors in holding out
for what they would regard as an appropriate
rescheduling deal.
Finance would be made available by the ¡FIs and, it
was hoped, by other sympathetic agencies (especially
from the balance of payments surplus countries) to
fund schemes of debt and debt service reduction.
It was this last measure, the instrumentation for which
will be described next, which has attracted most of the
attention. But the other three differences in their own
way could be just as important in determining the
actual impact of the new strategy.
The Meaning of 'Credit Enhancement'
The most spectacular innovation in Brady was the
proposal for debt reduction to be achieved within a
framework of voluntary actions by the commercial
banks. The key that was to make such voluntary
lowering of their claims acceptable to the banks was
the prospect of 'credit enhancement' which would
mean that a lower nominal claim against a debtor
could be of equal or greater value than the previous
higher claim because it would be collateralised or
guaranteed with the money for the guarantees and the
collateralisation or, in some cases, to finance debtor
government buy-backs of their loans for cash, coming
from the ¡MF, the World Bank and other well
disposed governments.
It has been argued, most cogently by Lomax,6 that it is
an anachronism to include within the same scheme for
a single country proposals for debt and debt service
reduction with proposals that some banks should
'This part of the analysis drasvs heavily on Robert Devlin 'The New
Ititernational Management of the 1.atin American Debt Problem', a
paper prepared for the seminar 'RanI Prehisch's Intellectual
Heritage and the Development Problems of Latirt America', Santa
Fe. Argentina, lune 1989.
'See D. F. Lomax 'International Monetary Arrangements - Recent
Proposals for Third World Debt', a paper submitted in evidence lo
the House of Couinions Treasury and Civil Service Cotr1nrrttee, .July
1989.
simultaneously supply what is euphemistically called
'new money'.7 Either a country should be regarded as
insolvent, the argument goes, in which case it requires
debt or debt service reduction, or it is only temporarily
illiquid, in which case its need is for 'new money' (or
temporary capitalisation of part of the interest due)
until it can get over a short- to medium-term difficulty
in its balance of payments. A view needs to be taken as
to whether or not the country should be regarded as
effectively insolvent; if it is not, debt reduction is
inappropriate and, if it is, 'new money' will simply
make the position worse.
Whatever sympathy one may feel for this line of
argument, it is clear that those who designed the Brady
proposals could not afford to admit its logic. The
reason they could not do so was because it was not
anticipated that sufficient financing would be
available to fund schemes of debt reduction and/or
that the discounts achieved in a voluntary negotiation
between debtor governments and bank advisory
committees would be sufficiently deep to offer the
required balance of payments relief unless a
proportion of commercial bank creditors were willing
and indeed preferred to increase their exposure to the
sovereign debtor by the provision of 'new money'.
There may also have been an apprehension that some
banks, particularly in the US, still could not afford to
take some of the losses resulting from taking one of the
debt reduction options even by the year 1990.
This diagnosis, if correct, would explain the
emergence of the three main options between which
creditor banks would be expected to choose in their
next rescheduling negotiations with eligible sovereign
debtors. The three options are by now famous but will
be summarised here. They were: (1) a given bank could
commit itself to a 'new money' package that would
involve re-lending a proportion of the interest due on
its existing loans thus increasing its exposure to the
country by an agreed proportion over an agreed
number of years; or (2) it could convert its existing
loans into bonds that would have a lower face value
but the same rate of interest; or (3) it could convert its
existing loans into bonds that would have the same
face value but a lower rate of interest. In the event of
the bank selecting either the new reduced face value or
reduced interest bonds it would benefit from the fact
that the eventual repayment of the principal would be
collateralised and the interest payments would be
secured for a certain period of time on a roll-forward
basis by one of the international financial institutions.
It should be stressed that these three options were still
to be accompanied by other measures such as 'cash
buy-backs up to a maximum amount', 'viable debt-
equity swap programmes', provisions that would
For an investigation of the use and ahuse of language in the Third
World dcht debate, see Mike Faber 'Beware of Dehtspeak' ¡DS
Discussion Paper, No. 25 t.
encourage domestic nationals to repatriate their flight
capital, 'concerted lending, club loans by a group of
banks, or a range of trade, investment or other credits
from individual banks'.8
The role of the IMF and the World Bank. in the view
of the US Treasury, would continue to be to encourage
and require debtor policy reforms, to supply finance
for stabilisation and adjustment programmes and to
catalyse other forms of financial support. But under
the new strategy they would also be asked to 'redirect
and increase resources to support debt and debt
service reduction transactions agreed upon by
commercial banks and debtor nations as an additional
spur to growth in debtor nations.'°
The Size of the Initiative
It is a feature of the Brady proposals that the quantum
of debt and debt service reduction that will result from
their implentation is unknown and unknowable. It is
unknowable because neither the amount of resources
to be devoted to debt reduction, nor the distribution of
their application between different forms of debt
reduction, nor the outcome of deals to be struck
between individual debtors and their creditors can be
known. Furthermore there are a variety of different
ways in which the extent of debt relief can be
measured. In these circumstances it is hardly
surprising that estimates range from the optimistic to
the pessimistic with any individual position in that
range being determined by factors as diverse as a
personal interest in the scheme's success, the effect of
the proposals on a bank's declared profits, or
animosity toward some officials at the US Treasury.
Most commentators however seem to be agreed on
three things. First, that the psychological climate in
which future debt rescheduling negotiations will be
conducted has been profoundly changed; second, that
the scheme will have a significant effect in some
countries in bringing about debt service relief; and
third, that the proposals by themselves with their
present level of funding will not get rid of more than
part of the debt overhang.
What is the anticipated level of funding? Early
indications were that the IME and World Bank were
each thinking in terms of $l2bn or so per institution
over the first three years. Of that total of $24 bn,
roughly $10 bn would be additional resources with the
remaining $l4bn being detoured from already
programmed policy lending. Another $4.5 bn in
parallel fending for import support has been
programmed by Japan.
Robert Devlin has commented:
David t'. Mulford The Brady Plan: strengthening the curreni
international debt st ra ieg' in Third World 1)ehî: Managing the
Consequences edited by S. Griffith-Jones, ¡FR Books, t989.
'ibid.
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'By just taking into account the Baker 17 countries,
where there is some $375 bn of obligations with
commercial creditors, it is clear that the $29 bn already
committed to the Brady Plan could support no more
than a very partial reduction on the debt overhang.
For example if used in straight buy-back of the Baker
17 debt at April's weighted average secondary market
price of 36 cents, the above mentioned public funding
could reduce commercial debt by some $80 bn. Even
this magnitude of debt reduction - which incidentally
is highly improbable in a voluntary scheme because it
assumes no rise in secondary market prices - would
bring a fall in the interest payments on the commercial
debt of these countries of only 21 per cent; meanwhile,
the reduction in total interest payments would be just
16 per cent."°
Devlin also points out that to the extent that debt
reduction is financed through new loans, cash flow
relief will be less than the reduction in interest
payments to the banks. Indeed loans from the IFIs or
for that matter grants from bilaterals that are used to
reduce or extinguish debt but which otherwise would
have been available for general balance of payments
support will have a strongly negative foreign exchange
flow impact in the initial year followed by a positive
'° R. Deviin. ibid.
JTable 1
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"ibid.
Long-Term Debt Outstanding
All Severely Indebted Developing Countries, except lines 8 and 10
(all figures and calculations based on US$, current)
Sources: WB World Debt Tables 1989-90, Vol 1, pp 122-3 and 78-9.
Notes: a These figures will continue to rise
b These figures will continue to fall
net foreign exchange flow impact in all subsequent
years. To that extent, as I have argued elsewhere, debt
reduction expenditures can be subjected to a form of
cost benefit analysis and their projected rates of return
compared with what could be anticipated by
alternative aid-financed projects.
Devlin concludes 'In any event, the resources
committed to the Brady Plan suggest a debt reduction
that will be piecemeal and which will fall far short of
achieving the 50 per cent or greater cut in interest
burdens that many heavily indebted countries seem to
feel they need now to begin to grow and develop.
Indeed, even the Plan's illustrative example of
achieving a 20 per cent reduction in the interest burden
of 39 developing countries over the next three years
would seem to require more resources than are
currently available. Moreover such a modest reduction
would not even compensate for the 40 per cent rise in
LIBOR over the last 18 months."'
The Evolving Composition of LDC Debt
However successful the Brady strategy turns out to be,
it must still be set within the organic composition of
LDC indebtedness as a whole. The structure of
1970 ¡982 1988
¡ long-terni External I)ebt ($bn) 31.2 313.5 529.Ö
2. Average annual increase, 1970-1982 +21.25%
3. Average annual increase. 1982-1988 +9 .Ø0%
4. Percentage public and publicly guaranteed 61.3% 78.5Y 93.1%
5. Percentage owed to multilaterals 10.1% 8.5% 14.0%'
6. Percentage owed to bilaterals 23.2% 14.6% 23.7%'
7. Percentage all official creditors 33.3% 23.3% 37.7%"
8. Line 7 for a/I developing countries n.a. 35.4% 45.2%'
9. Percentage of both public and private
debt owed to commercial banks
48.4% 62.9% 505%h
10. Line 9 for a//developing countries 31.6% 50.4%
creditors is dynamic and changing quite rapidly and
yet much less attention is normally paid to it than to
the list of debtors and the extent of their individual
indebtedness. Table I illustrates what is meant by 'the
evolving composition of LDC Debt'; several points
that emerge from it deserve comment.
Unes 1,2 and 3 show the long-term external debt ofall
severely indebted developing countries expanding at a
compound rate of 21.25 per cent a year over the
12 .year period terminating in 1982, and at a rate of
9 per cent in the six years following. Of that earlier
period, one is tempted to ask 'What did the bankers
think they were doing?' Part of the answer is 'They did
not know'. Or rather, each knew how fast his own
business was expanding but was unaware that
borrowing from others was expanding even faster. 1f
the Brady proposals succeed and interest rates fall,
we may postulate that the successor figure to that in
line 3 for the period 1988-1994 may indeed become
negative.
Line 4 demonstrates how, partly on the insistence of
creditors, a higher and higher portion of each
country's indebtedness has either become government
debt, or has had to be guaranteed by government.
Lines 5, 6 and 7 show how quickly the proportion of
Severely Indebted Countries' debt owed to the
multilaterals (IFIs) and bilaterally to other govern-
ments has been increasing - namely by more than
2 per cent a year as a percentage of all such debt since
1982. The reasons for this are clear. While most
commercial banks have been doing all that they can to
reduce their exposure to LDC debtors, the World
Bank has continued to make positive net transfers and
the Paris Club has continued to do the equivalent of
advancing 'new money' through its own extensive
rescheduling arrangements. But the implications of
this process continuing should be equally clear.
Already, as line 8 and 10 show, all developing
countries together owe more medium- and long-term
debt to the bilaterals and to the ¡FIs than they do to
the commercial banks. If the Brady proposals succeed
this trend can do nothing but accelerate so that by
1994 it is quite conceivable that up to three-quarters of
all medium- and long-term sovereign debt of all
developing countries will be owed to official creditors.
A number of disturbing conclusions follow from that
prediction, of which I shall mention just three: First
conclusion: it is clear that the debt overhang cannot be
removed simply by reducing LDC indebtedness to the
commercial banks however large the discount they can
be induced to accept in loan-bond conversions.
Second conclusion (vide line 6): an early priority is
going to be a solution to 'the Free-Rider Problem
between Governments' which at the moment is
gravely impeding the introduction of significant debt
reduction to the proceedings of the Paris Club. Third
conclusion: The next plan after Brady is going to have
to incorporate more extensive and more open
procedures for those whose indebtedness to the ¡FIs
themselves (including arrears) has grown to a size that
clearly cannot be serviced on the original contractual
terms.
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